This empirical study examines the determinants and impacts of incentive regulations introduced by utility commissions in the late '70s and early '80s. Rewards for generating plant utilization and low heat rates were found to have been introduced in states whose firms exhibited relatively high managerial slack (or relatively higher costs). However, the empirical results did not find that the introduction of specific cost component incentives improved overall operating cost Performance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a number of state regulatory commissions have established "incentive regulation"
programs, to promote efficiency in electricity production. Unlike proposed price-cap regulations which provide firms with a comprehensive incentive to control costs, these narrow incentive payment programs condition financial rewards or penalties upon a specific measure of a utility's performance.
A program included in our data base is defined by the Edison Electric Institute (1987) as one which "(i) is intended to improve regulated utilities' performance, (ii) evaluates utility performance against specific, pre-defined standards, (iii) provides incentives (rewards) or disincentives (punishments), depending on the utility's performance in relation to applicable standards," (p. 11).
These~centive payment programs take many forms and focus on different operating statistics:
they reward utilities which experience high levels of base load generating unit utilization and availability, low heat rates (reflecting the efficient transformation of fuel into electricity), and keep fuel and purchased power costs below externally-determined indices. For example, the State of Florida adopted an incentive regulation entitled "Generating Performance Incentive Factor (GPIF)" in 1980.
1 The GPIF program sets the targets for many indicators including average heat rates, fuel expenses, and past performance records etc. by complex formulas estimated by several computer simulations of the utility system's economic dispatch. Rewards and penalties are imposed by comparing actual performance with pre-set targets. Since we focus on an ex ante decoupling of prices from cost components, expost prudence/efficiency reviews and management audits are excluded from the programs examined here.
While the theoretical rationale for introducing incentive regulations is described elsewhere, 2 the 1 For details, see Edison Electricity Institute (1987).
2 For example, see Joskow and Schmalensee (1986) or Johnson (1985) .
effectiveness of incentive regulation has not been empirically tested. (1987) . Although the overall sample included 53 utility companies for a 15 year period (795 potential observations), due to the missing data for some years, only 490 observations were actually available for estimation in a pooled data set. The firms in the data set are listed in Table 1 . Some descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2 . Dropping the 14 firms with the most missing observations entirely from the sample did not materially affect the results, so we report the results for 53 firms.
ill. THE DETERMINANTS OF INCENTIVE REGULATION: UTILITY PERFORMANCE
The first issue to be addressed when evaluating incentive payment regulations for electric utilities is the appropriate measure of utility performance. The actual measures which state commissions are using vary, so a unique index is impossible to obtain. 3 Two proxies for utility performance have been utilized here: management slack and generation heat rate. Selten (1986) and Abdel-khalik (1988) propose 'management slack' as an efficiency measure of utility's performance, defined as
where Si is the managerial slack of firm i, C i is log operating cost of firm i, and C i * is the predicted value of log operating cost for firm i. Si is the relative deviation of that firm's operating cost from industry-wide average operating cost (at that output level Relatively high costs will trigger regulatory innovations (Joskow, 1974) .
Also, the heat rate, defined as the energy input in BTU used for 1 kwh electric generation, has been widely used as a measure of operating efficiency.4 Higher heat rate has been interpreted as inefficient performance. Of course, heat rates will differ across fJIttls due to many factors, including average age of generating units (reflecting technological differences and historical demand growth patterns), generating mix (base load vs. peaking capacity --where the mix depends on seasonal and daily demand patterns), and environmental regulations in place when capacity investments were made.
Thus, heat rates may not be a good proxy for relative efficiency.
Besides these proxies for utilities' performance, other variables can affect commissions' decisions on the adoption of incentive regulations. First, we need to determine whether a commission's adoption of incentive regulations depends on the firm's managerial slack or on heat rates, or both.
To test which one is the better proxy, the following Probit MLE model is estimated.
where, Ii = 1 when firm i is regulated by an incentive program = 0 when firm i is not regulated by an incentive program Si = the managerial slack of firm i (based on three years)
= the heat rate of firm i
LOADF == total generation / (system capacity * 8760)
= the load factor of firm i GEN i = log of total generation of firm i.
A problem in the estimation of equation (2) is the endogeneity of Si. Si is endogenous in the sense that the adoption of incentive regulations will affect utilities' managerial slack. To avoid the endogeneity bias, observations are deleted in the following cases: 2) For non-incentive regulated firms, data after 1980 are deleted for estimating equation (2) since incentive regulation lowered industry average oost--so that the non-regulated firms will have higher measured managerial slack. 1980 is chosen because it is the mean of the starting year for payment incentive regulations. Note that non-incentive regulated firms are included in the sample for the estimation of the operating cost equation.
The variables MAR, LOADF and GEN are included in equation (2) since other factors can also trigger institutional innovations. We postulate that commissions will tend to adopt incentive regulations if the electric utility has high prices relative to costs. In our model, higher margin does not necessarily mean high cost of inefficiency because the margin is defined as "(revenue/cost) -1" and the average revenue varies more than the average cost in our data set. Thus, the margin is more affected by the price (as approximated by average revenue) than the average cost (efficiency).6
Rate hearings can take a very long time to lower prices, while the introduction of an incentive which targets gen<?rating unit availability or heat rates can. occur relatively quickly. The incentive regulation can provide a mechanism for sharing further cost savings as well as for penalizing inefficiency.
Also, if a utility already has a high load factor, there is less opportunity for cost savings via rate design changes which induce alterations in consumption patterns. Regulators would then press for cost reductions via explicit incentive programs. In addition, we hypothesize that a large electric utility (GEN) has greater political visibility. Furthermore, economic savings for large frrms will be greater for equal percentage cost reductions. So we expect the signs on all three variables to be positive.
As noted earlier, the expected signs of a 1 and a 2 are also positive.
The slack index, Si (defined in equation 1) is obtained from the following operating cost function.
where, C i = log of the operating cost for firm i RESCAP i = the reserve capacity of firm i == (System Capacity -Peak Demand) / System Capacity HYR i = log of the percentage of electricity produced by hydroelectric generation NUC~= log of the percentage of electricity produced by nuclear plants
The es.timated parameters for the scale (GEN) variables will indicate the shape of the cost function --the extent of scale economies. High RESCAP can be interpreted as reflecting a disequilibrium capacity situation--both level and mix. During this Period, most electric utilities had forecasted substantial demand growth. When forecasts were not realized, firms were left with excessive reserve margins. Hydro (HYR) and nuclear (NUCR) ought to be associated with lower operating costs. The year was included to capture upward shifts in the cost function --reflecting wage inflation, rising fuel costs, and environmental expenses occurring during the second half of the sample period.
The results of the cost function (3) are as follows: 
Equation (5) In (5), the managerial slack is the better proxy for utilities' performance than heat rate. So, Sj will be used as a proxy for electric utilities' performance in further estimation. Is the slack a proxy for performance or a predictor of commissions' decision? In the analysis, commissions are assumed to be efficient. In other words, they can precisely evaluate their utilities' performance. This assumption is unavoidable in this kind of empirical study because the utilities' performances are not 7 To compare our results with other cost estimates, we re-estimated (4) without the cubic term. Explanatory power drops, but the results are similar to those obtained by Atkinson and Halvorsen (1986) . The re-calculation of Sj from this alternative specification does not change our conclusions. directly measurable. With this assumption, a good predictor of commissions' decision is, at the same time, a good proxy for utilities' performance.
IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF INCENTIVE REGULATIONS
The second question in evaluating incentive regulations is whether or not they have been successful. To test if the cost component incentive regulation programs have achieved their goals, an ordinary dummy test can be conducted using the following equation. 
where E i and Wi are bivariate-normal and are independent of all the exogenous variables. This simultaneous equations system can be called a "limited dependent simultaneous equation system" since the dependent variable in the second equation is a binary variable. Note that both equations are exactly identified.
Two alternative consistent estimation methods are available for the above simultaneous equations model. First, Maddala and Lee (1976) and Barnow et al. (1980) suggest the following two-step estimation procedures. The system (6)- (7) can be rewritten with the reduced form of the equation (7) as (8): (6) (8) Note that E i and 7T i have a bivariate normal distribution.
In the first step, the so-called inverse-Mill's ratio is computed from the equation (8), where the inverse-Mill's ratio is defined as: unknown parameter 8 luw' it can be estimated by the probit MLE of the equation (8). In the second step, consistent estimators for the equation (6) can be obtained by OLS after adding to the equation (6) the inverse-Mill's ratio computed from the equation (8) as an additional regressor.
An alternative consistent estimation proposed by Amemiya (1978) , Heckman (1978) , and Lee (1979) is the following.
9 First, estimate the equation (8) 
v. ESTIMATION RESULTS
The profit MLE applied to the equation (8) gives the following results: The two step estimation suggested by Maddala-Lee (1978) and Barnowet al. (1980) 
9 The estimation method presented here is a simple version of Amemiya (1978) , Heckman (1978) , Lee (1979) .
The hypothesis H o : Yl =0 vs. HI : Yl <0 is not rejected even at 10% significance level in (11).
This implies that the incentive regulations during 1973 -1985 did not achieve the goal of reducing the managerial slack of utility companies. We can also see in (11) that the slack is lower in more profitable (higher margin) utilities, in high load factor utilities, and in smaller utilities. These results seem reasonable. The results indicate that the reserve capacity of the utility does not affect the level of managerial slack. This outcome may arise because slack is defined only in terms of operating costs. 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The goal of specific target incentive payment regulations in electric production during [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] appears to be the reduction of managerial slack. However we did not find that the slack was significantly reduced by narrow incentive regulations. A possible explanation is that by focusing on specific categories or determinants of cost, regulators induce utilities to devote excessive resources to ensuring that a narrow goal is reached--so no net cost savings are realized (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1986, p. 38; Berg and Tschirhart, 1988, p. 517-519) .
One area for further research is investigating the duration of incentive programs. Some state commissions discontinued their incentive regulation programs after several years. Our simultaneous model only tested whether the existence of a program in that year had an impact --yet some of these programs were subsequently discontinued. By comparing these discontinued programs with the continuing programs, one can better evaluate the impact of incentive regulations. Another direction for research is the introduction of political and administrative factors into the model. For example Nowell and Tschirhart (1990) examined the determinants of state adoption of PURPA, finding that political and interest group strength affect the probability of adopting the costof service standard. Such factors could be introduced into the model. In another study of regulation, Mathios and Rogers (1989) examined the impacts of different types of intra-state long distance telephone regulation. They found that price-cap regimes lead to lower prices than rate-of return regulation. However, their reduced form model does not take into account potential similaneity problems regarding the determinants of states adopting different regulatory policies. The present study of electricity regulation attempts to avoid that problem. Joskow (1974) noted how regulatory innovations were introduced during economic dislocations (the advent of inflation and new environmental laws). Similarly, we can identify early incentive regulations as stemming from concerns with managerial slack. Our inability to find an impact of cost component regulation suggests that either the factors affecting performance are not adequately 
